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Why do neurons have dendritic spines? This question—the heart of what Yuste calls “the
spine problem”—presupposes that why-questions of this sort have scientific answers:
that empirical findings can favor or count against claims about why neurons have spines.
Here we show how such questions can receive empirical answers. We construe such
why-questions as questions about how spines make a difference to the behavior of some
mechanism that we take to be significant. Why-questions are driven fundamentally by the
effort to understand how some item, such as the dendritic spine, is situated in the causal
structure of the world (the causal nexus). They ask for a filter on that busy world that allows
us to see a part’s individual contribution to a mechanism, independent of everything else
going on. So understood, answers to why-questions can be assessed by testing the claims
these answers make about the causal structure of a mechanism. We distinguish four ways
of making a difference to a mechanism (necessary, modulatory, component, background
condition), and we sketch their evidential requirements. One consequence of our analysis
is that there are many spine problems and that any given spine problem might have many
acceptable answers.
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INTRODUCTION
Science, according to common wisdom, does not answer why
questions. Science tells us only what and how things happen.
Nowhere is this common wisdom more transparently false than
in anatomy and physiology, where a central pre-occupation is
to understand why organisms have the parts they do. These
questions have been central to research on dendritic spines from
the start. Cajal’s pioneering judgment that spines are not merely
artifacts of Golgi staining prompted the transparently teleological
question: why do neurons have spines? Yuste (2011) refers to this
as the “Spine Problem”: “What exactly do spines contribute to the
neuron?”.
Cajal (1899) considered several answers to this question
(García-López et al., 2007): that spines increase the “receptive
surface” of the neuron, that they “absorb” nerve impulses, (Cajal,
1899, ibid. 119), and that they grow out to connect with distant
axons. Theories of spine function have since proliferated. Shep-
herd, for example, reviews ten broad classes of theory, each of
which can be specified in myriad ways (see Table 1, Shepherd,
1996, 2198). His list includes contributions spines might make
to synaptic connectivity, development, synapse electrophysiol-
ogy, synaptic plasticity, active processing of monosynaptic input,
temporal processing of polysynaptic input, biochemical compart-
mentalization, and features of the membrane surface.
Here we explore the nature of these why-questions and the
evidence required to test them. We show how these why-questions
contribute to the search for neural mechanisms, distinguish sev-
eral kinds of answers, and show how the mechanistic under-
standing of such why-questions and their answers connects those
answers to empirical evidence about the causal structure of the
world.
Our view of why-questions relies on the central idea that
explanations in neuroscience describe mechanisms. Mechanisms
consist of entities and activities organized in space and time so
that they exhibit some behavior of the mechanism as a whole.
Explanatory models of such mechanisms describe the spatial,
temporal, and active organization of causally interacting parts.
The effort to answer why-questions is a central part of the search
for mechanisms that span multiple levels (Shepherd, 1983). Our
focus is on these why-questions and, in particular, on what they
contribute to our understanding of how the brain works, how it
breaks, and how it might be improved. Why-questions, like how-
and what- questions, are indispensable in the effort to understand
hierarchically organized systems.
CAUSAL-MECHANICAL EXPLANATION
To answer a why-question about some item (such as dendritic
spines) is to represent it as part of a causal-mechanical expla-
nation for something else. Causal-mechanical explanations in
general show how a phenomenon to be explained, the explanan-
dum phenomenon, is situated in the causal nexus—how it was
produced, how it acts, and how it interacts with other things
in the world. One can situate the explanandum phenomenon in
the causal nexus in three ways: etiologically, constitutively, and
contextually.
Etiological explanations show how the phenomenon came to
pass. They look back to reveal its antecedent causes. The tipped
lantern, for example, is part of the etiological explanation for the
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fire. Likewise, spine loss may be part of the etiological explanation
for several neuropsychological disorders (Penzes et al., 2011).
Constitutive explanations answer how questions by looking
down to reveal the mechanisms that underlie or maintain the phe-
nomenon. They look inside it and describe how parts, properties,
and activities are organized together in space and time such that
the phenomenon occurs. Constitutive explanations often span
multiple levels: higher level mechanisms are explained by lower
level mechanisms, which are in turn explained by mechanisms at
a lower level still, and so on. The binding of neurotransmitters
to receptors on dendritic spines is part of the constitutive expla-
nation for many instances of excitatory synaptic transmission,
which are themselves involved in most of the interesting things
brains do. Looking down, synaptic transmission involves numer-
ous chemical interactions and atomic processes well beneath the
current grain of explanatory interest. Multilevel mechanisms in
neuroscience thus typically require research in several different
fields (cellular, cognitive, etc.), since different fields are better
suited for studying different levels of mechanisms.
These two aspects of causal-mechanical explanation each relate
the explanandum phenomenon to the causal structure of the
world in a different way. Etiological explanations look back to the
causal structures that brought it about. Constitutive explanations
look down to the causal structures that make it work. Each, in
its own way, tells us how the explanandum phenomenon comes
about.
WHY-QUESTIONS AND CONTEXT: A THIRD ASPECT OF
CAUSAL-MECHANICAL EXPLANATION
The third aspect of causal-mechanical explanation is contextual.
Contextual explanations describe the role or function of spines.
Like constitutive explanations, contextual explanation are inter-
level, but rather than looking back or looking down, contextual
explanations look up and around to situate the item in question
within a higher-level mechanism (Cummins, 1983; Craver, 2001).
They tell us why neurons have spines.
Recent reviews of dendritic spine function reflect this causal-
mechanical understanding of why questions and their answers.
Harris and Kater (1994) argue that to understand the function
of dendritic spines one must consider them, “within the context
of the overall synaptic complex” including not just the spine
but “the post-synaptic density, the synaptic cleft, the presynaptic
axonal bouton and its vesicles, and the neighboring astrocytic
complexes” (Harris 348). Each theory in Shepherd’s (1996) list
situates dendritic spines within a more inclusive mechanism.
Yuste (2011) focuses on one of Shepherd’s contextual mecha-
nisms: the construction and maintenance of a distributed network
with independently modifiable synapses. In each case, the goal
is to look up and see how dendritic spines make a difference
to the behavior of some system of antecedently acknowledged
significance.
More abstractly, the answer to a why-question for an item such
as a dendritic spine involves attributing a function or role to the
item. This attribution can be distilled into four components:
1. A mechanism displaying a behavior in salient conditions (e.g.,
forming a network of modifiable synapses).
2. The mechanism’s behavior in these conditions is antecedently
presumed to be important (e.g., because it affords flexible
information processing).
3. Some item (part, property, or activity) is a spatio-temporal
part of this system (e.g., spines, their morphology, or their
growth).
4. The item makes a difference to the system behaving as it does
in these conditions.
The mechanism and behavior described in (a) constitute
the causal context in which the item functions. We place no
constraints on the behaviors in (a) except that (b) they are
antecedently presumed significant. Specifically, the behavior does
not need to have contributed to the evolution (Neander, 1991) or
development (Garson, 2011) of spines. Why-questions also arise
in pathology and engineering: researchers study, for example, the
role of spines in the etiological mechanisms of Down’s syndrome
(Kaufmann and Moser, 2000) and the role spines might play in
the treatment of addiction (Robinson and Kolb, 1999).
Condition (c) distinguishes contextual or functional explana-
tion from etiological and constitutive explanation by requiring
that the functional item be part of (contained within) the mecha-
nism. Condition (d) requires that the item must make a difference
to how the system behaves. If a part can make no difference at all
to how the mechanism behaves, the why-question has no answer.
Constitutive, etiological, and contextual explanations are sep-
arate aspects of the same, mechanistic explanatory objective: the
what, the how, and the why combine to situate an item in the
causal nexus (for more recent work on evidence-based discovery
see Craver and Darden, 2013; Silva et al., 2013).
MANY ANSWERS TO THE SAMEWHY QUESTION
Why-questions ask us to situate an item within the context of
a higher-level mechanism. Clearly the same item can contribute
to the behavior of many mechanisms at once—it can have many
functions. This appears to be what Shepherd (1996) has in mind
when he claims that dendritic spines are multifunctional units.
Each theory in Shepherd’s list of functions situates spines in a
different causal context. This raises the reasonable prospect that
there are many “spine problems” and many equally good solutions
to each of them.
One reason to expect a multiplicity of functions is that dis-
tinct answers to the same why-question can be hierarchically
related to one another. Harris and Kater (1994), for example,
argue that spine shape compartmentalizes synaptic input, which
facilitates LTP induction at single hippocampal synapses. Long-
term potentiation, in turn, implements weight adjustment in
computing networks that subserve learning and memory. These
different functional attributions describe the same feature of
spines in the context of different levels in one hierarchy of mech-
anisms (Craver, 2001, 2002; cf. Shepherd, 1983; Churchland and
Sejnowski, 1992). The function attributed at one level (plasticity)
requires or depends on the functions attributed in lower-level
contexts (compartmentalization).
A second reason to expect that spines have multiple functions
is that they make a difference to the behavior of many different
systems. Spines have been hypothesized to stabilize dendrites
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(Kasai et al., 2010; Koleske, 2013), to protect cells from calcium
toxicity (Harris and Kater, 1994; Segal, 1995), and to prevent
synaptic input from short-circuiting the dendritic membrane
(Yuste, 2011). These hypotheses are not competitors—spines
contribute to many higher-level phenomenon, and they do so in
different ways.
The fact that an item might play different roles in different
higher-level containing systems has important implications for
extrapolating the results of experimental findings. Given that
there are many different memory systems, in different brain
regions, with different underlying mechanisms, dendritic spines
might play different roles in different memory systems. The same
item might also play a similar functional role when described with
respect to some lower-level mechanism, but an altogether differ-
ent functional role when described at higher levels. Similarities
and differences at multiple levels of organization can influence
the extent to which experimental findings extrapolate to other
systems and other organisms.
WHAT QUESTIONS: ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON
FUNCTIONAL ATTRIBUTION
Many kinds of evidence can be used to argue for a particular
theory concerning how an item is situated in a higher-level system.
Some of this evidence is circumstantial in nature, concerning,
e.g., spatial (size, shape, location, orientation) and temporal
(order, rate, duration) findings about spines, their components,
and their mechanistic context. Anatomical properties, such as
spine locations, dimensions, morphologies, sub-structures, and
organelles provide clues as to how spines might make a dif-
ference (Harris and Kater, 1994; Shepherd, 1996; García-López
et al., 2007). Evidence about the time-course of intrinsic and
activity-driven changes in spine morphology provides a dynamic,
temporal perspective on the place of spines in the causal order
of the brain (Kasai et al., 2010). Comparative evidence reveals
correlations between spine density and specialization of certain
brain areas (Elston et al., 2001). Such observations about what
spines and their causal context are like can be combined with
mathematical models to show how such properties would and
would not influence the system’s behavior (Koch and Zador, 1993;
Yuste, 2013). Findings of this sort provide global constraints on
what spines can do in any context and specific constraints on what
they can contribute to a particular mechanism.
Yet such findings offer only indirect tests of the causal claims
at the heart of functional attributions. Correlational studies pro-
vide clues to the causal structure of a system but are almost
always compatible with multiple causal structures (Eberhardt and
Scheines, 2007). Models are useful for exploring a space of possi-
bilities, but models of dendritic spine function depend crucially
on idealized assumptions about the relevant structures (Harris
and Kater, 1994) and on the values of unmeasured parameters
(Yuste, 2013). Evidence about the time-course of spine changes,
by itself, does not tell us about the causal forces that drive the
development of the system over time.
WAYS OF MAKING A DIFFERENCE
Functional attributions—answers to why-questions—can be
tested more directly by evaluating experimentally the causal
claims at their heart. Ideally, these causal claims are tested by inter-
vening to change only the putative causal variable and observing
whether this change makes a difference to the effect in question.
Causal experiments test directly how an item can and does make
a difference within a higher-level mechanism.
Four categories of functional attribution appear to be evi-
dentially, explanatorily, and practically distinct. On one axis, an
item might make a difference either by being necessary for a
system’s behavior or by modulating its behavior. Removing a
necessary item prevents the behavior; removing a modulatory
item merely changes it. On a second axis, an item might be either
a component or a background condition. A component is a working
part in the system; a background condition merely enables or
assists the working parts. Combining the axes yields four kinds of
functional role: necessary components, modulatory components,
necessary background conditions, and modulatory background
conditions.
Consider a specific example, which follows Stevens (1998)
general framework. If changes in spine morphology are necessary
working components in the mechanism of LTP, then the following
causal claims should be true: (i) conditions that induce LTP
should change spine morphology; (ii) preventing changes in spine
morphology should prevent LTP; and (iii) inducing changes in
spine morphology should be able to produce LTP in the right
conditions. Condition (ii) expresses the idea of necessity in the
relation; conditions (i) and (iii) combine to express the idea of
componency—being a part that is sufficient in the circumstances
to produce the mechanism’s behavior (Mackie, 1980).
To put this causal analysis to work, consider the hypothesis that
spine enlargement is a necessary component in the mechanism of
LTP induction. Spines appear to enlarge following LTP induction
in accordance with condition (i) (Matsuzaki et al., 2004). And
if one blocks the polymerization of actin molecules thought to
be required for spine enlargement, one can prevent late LTP
(Ramachandran and Frey, 2009). This provides some evidence
that actin-based remodeling of spines is necessary for LTP (Bosch
et al., 2014).
The status of (iii) is more complicated. We know a lot about
what potentiated synapses are like. The volume of the spine head
is directly proportional to the size of the post-synaptic density,
to the number of post-synaptic receptors, to the size of the pre-
synaptic bouton, to the number of vesicles generally docked at
the pre-synaptic bouton, and to the quantity of neurotransmitter
available for release at the synapse (Nimchinsky et al., 2002;
García-López et al., 2007). However, these correlations provide
only circumstantial evidence that head size makes a difference to
LTP. More direct causal experiments that induce LTP by changing
spine morphology are required to establish (iii) directly. It thus
remains to be seen whether spine enlargement per se makes a
difference to LTP or whether it is merely a byproduct of processes
that strengthen the synapse in other ways (Redondo and Morris,
2011).
A modulatory working component satisfies (i), but not (ii)
or (iii). If spine enlargement modulates LTP, then preventing
spine growth would alter LTP but not prevent it (contra ii). And
changes in morphology would not, by themselves, produce LTP
(contra iii). However, changes in morphology should make a
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difference to how LTP is induced or expressed. Whether a modu-
latory factor is considered a background condition or a working
component depends on the relationship between the factor and
the other components in the system: working components work
together with other components to produce the phenomenon,
while background conditions are less directly implicated in the
phenomenon.
A necessary background condition satisfies (ii) but not (i)
or (iii). Removing a necessary background condition prevents
the system from functioning. Background conditions tend to be
causally independent from the operating conditions of the sys-
tem: changes induced in the background conditions are therefore
considered to make no difference to the system’s behavior in the
relevant conditions.
This way of thinking about functional attributions and the
evidence used to evaluate them can be extended to multiple levels
of organization. It can be used as a framework to refine and eval-
uate causal evidence for distinct functional attributions. Focus on
the role of dendritic spines in learning and memory. Experience-
based changes in spine morphology have been proposed as a
basis for long-term memory formation and retention (Bourne
and Harris, 2007), but it is unclear just what this functional
claim amounts to. The above framework can be used to more
specifically describe how spine density changes make a difference
in experience-based learning. The conditions that give rise to
changes in experience also give rise to changes in spine formation
(Sala and Segal, 2014), suggesting (i) is fulfilled. Other studies
suggest that interfering with the formation of new spines impairs
learning abilities (Soderling et al., 2007), but preventing spine
formation may not eliminate learning entirely (contra ii). Studies
showing that changes in spine density do not necessarily result in
changes in learning and memory (Popov et al., 2007; Fester et al.,
2012) suggest (iii) is not fulfilled. Spine formation thus appears
to have a working modulatory role in some forms of learning and
memory.
In short, this causal-mechanical analysis allows us to distin-
guish different kinds of functional hypotheses—different ways of
making a difference to the behavior of a higher-level mechanism.
Each situates an item differently within the causal context. Given
that functional attributions are inherently multilevel, this analysis
shows how functional attributions—answers to why-questions—
integrate lower-level findings with findings about higher-level
behaviors or mechanisms. Contextual explanation is inherently
upward-looking and, in that sense, non-reductive.
CONCLUSION
Answering why-questions, like answering how and what ques-
tions, helps to reveal the causal structure of the world. When
we ask why neurons have dendritic spines, we are asking how
spines fit into the workings of this most spectacular machine.
Seen in this light, to claim that dendritic spines have a function
in the nervous system is, implicitly, to commit one’s self to a
set of causal claims about how that item makes a difference in
a mechanistic context. Functional attributions gain their content
from these causal claims and are evaluated most directly by testing
whether those causal claims are true. Spines might play a role
at many levels of organization in the nervous system and in
many distinct causal systems, and might function as a necessary
or modulatory component or background condition in each.
Attention to the causal commitments of our functional claims
helps to highlight and prioritize the diverse kinds of evidence
required to evaluate them. So understood, Yuste’s spine problem
is likely not one problem but many, reflecting the many ways
that spines might be situated in the complex causal nexus of the
brain.
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